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abstract 
This paper examines the trading strategy attributed to Mr. Nicholas Leeson, who was the chief derivatives 
trader of Barings bank in Singapore. His activities were the main cause of the eventual collapse of Barings 
bank. Daily information is available for the full period Leeson was active in Singapore, from January 1992 
until 1995, for all relevant products. The information includes daily volume, open interest, opening, 
closing, highest and lowest price. The empirical evidence suggests that Leeson followed a doubling 
strategy: he continuously doubled his position as prices were falling. 
 
 
acknowledgements 
We would like to thank the Osaka Securities Exchange, Mr. Naoto Watari in particular, and the 
Singapore Exchange for providing data and comments. Also, we would like to thank the Institute for 
Monetary and Economic Studies of the Bank of Japan. An earlier version of this paper was presented at 
the 2nd Central Bank Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk, November 1998, Tokyo and at 
the 12th PACAP/FMA/AIBF Banking & Finance Conference, July 2000, in Melbourne, Australia. Finally, 
we would like to thank an anonymous referee. 
 
* Corresponding author: 
 2
 E-mail address: steenbeek@few.eur.nl 
 3
Doubling: Nick Leeson's trading strategy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the trading strategy attributed to Mr. Nicholas Leeson, who was the 
chief derivatives trader of Barings bank in Singapore. His activities were the main cause of 
the eventual collapse of Barings bank. The evidence suggests that Leeson followed a 
doubling strategy: he continuously doubled his position as prices were falling. 
 
Leeson's trading activities mainly involved three futures markets: Futures on the Japanese 
Nikkei 225 stock index, futures on 10-year Japanese Government bonds (JGB futures) and 
Euroyen futures. These products are all traded simultaneously and in similar design on 
SIMEX and on a Japanese exchange. Leeson's main assignment was to arbitrage between 
SIMEX and the exchanges in Japan and try to capitalize on small price differences 
between the futures contracts. In reality, however, he was taking massive speculative 
positions, financing SIMEX’ margin requirements by selling options and borrowing huge 
amounts of money from Barings’ head offic in London. By the end of February 1995, the 
losses had become too large and Barings bank went bankrupt. 
 
Our interest in Mr. Leeson comes from the fact that doubling strategies are potentially 
dangerous from a systemic point of view. An important attribute of doubling strategies is 
that the inevitable and devastating loss is preceded by a period of high returns with low 
volatility. Conditional on the bad event not having happened (yet), the doubler’s 
investment performance appears to indicate significant investme skill. The doubler may 
then become too big to fail, both from the perspective of the investment firm and from the 
market regulators1, so that the inevitable failure can have catastrophic effects, both for the 
firm and for the market. Among other things, this has important consequences for the 
                                         
1 As of December 1994 Barings Futures (Singapore) was responsible for 7.86% of the volume of trading 
on SIMEX making them the second largest trader on that exchange, while at the end of February, just 
prior to the failure of Barings,  they took number one position, with a 8.78% share of the total volume of 
trades (Lim and Tan (1995), Appendix 2A). 
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effectiveness of Value at Risk-controls. Being able to track and take out these traders 
sooner, would limit possible systemic risks. 
 
Our empirical study follows two paths. First, we examine the raw daily data provided by 
the exchanges to see whether a doubler may have been active during the period when 
Leeson was active. Second, we look at the actual data on Leeson’s activities during the 
final weeks of his career, in order to find out whether Leeson indeed foll wed a doubling 
strategy. Based on the analysis of the raw data, we conclude that someone, probably 
Leeson, did indeed follow a doubling strategy in these markets. This impression is 
confirmed when we study his trading immediately prior to the failure of Barings. Leeson 
clearly expanded his exposure substantially when prices fell, while selling off some of his 
gains when price rose. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the authorized and 
unauthorized trading activities which led to th  collapse of Barings, Section 3 focuses on 
the issue of doubling in general. Section 4 discusses previous literature on the relationship 
between volume and returns. Section 5 presents the data and the methodology, followed 
by our empirical results in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Barings collapse 
 
2.1 Background 
On July 1, 1992, Barings Futures Singapore (BFS) started trading on the Singapore 
International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Mr. Nicholas Leeson was put in charge of 
operations for BFS, with responsibilities both for trading and the accounting and 
settlements activities. It was believed to be unnecessary to segregate these functions, 
because Leeson and his staff would merely execute orders placed by other Baring Group 
companies on behalf of their external clients (SR 3.1, 5.15).2 Later in 1992 this situation 
                                         
2 Reference to the report prepared by Lim and Tan (1995) for the Ministry for Finance in Singapore will 
be by paragraph number. SR stands for Singapore Report, while the numbers stand for the paragraph that 
is referred to. 
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gradually changed, because many Japanese institutional investors had set up their own 
execution capability in Singapore. As a result, the external client business of Baring 
Securities Japan (BSJ) became less viable (Hogan, 1999). To compensate for the loss in 
this line of business, BSJ commenced proprietary trading on behalf of the Barings group. 
One of the primary trading strategies they implemented was arbitraging baskets of stocks 
in the Japanese cash market against Nikkei futures (SR2.10). Initially, these transactions 
were executed between the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Osaka Securities 
Exchange (OSE), which was the main market for Nikkei futures. However, after the OSE 
had implemented tighter restrictions, trading on SIMEX became easier and cheaper. As a 
result, BSJ traders asked Leeson to execute Nikkei futures trades on SIMEX (SR2.11). 
The trading volume handled by Leeson gradually increased over time and by early 1993, 
Leeson was involved in executing proprietary trades as well as trades for the external 
clients of the Barings Group (SR2.13). 
 As a result of these developments, a new business opportunity arose, in which 
Leeson would play a major role, i.e. arbitrage trading of the Nikkei futures contract 
between SIMEX and the OSE. Apparently, large price differences existed between the 
two contracts that were very similar in design. The profits from exploiting such price 
differences between exchanges are small and therefore trading volumes tend to be large. 
Still, the risks are low, because every long position on one exchange is offset by a short 
position on the other. In addition to arbitrage trading, Leeson developed an even more 
lucrative activity, namely ‘switching’. As Barings was able to trade in Japan as well as in 
Singapore, it could select the cheapest market to execute a client’s order. For example, it 
could tell a client it would buy 1000 Nikkei futures contracts in Osaka, while in reality it 
made the purchase on SIMEX, where at that moment the price was lower. Barings would 
charge the client the price quoted on the OSE or slightly better, which was still worse than 
the price in Singapore. The difference meant extra profit for Barings (SR3.9). This 
selection of the more profitable location of the two to do business, was referred to as 
‘switching’. 
The end result of all these activities was that the Structured Products Group, 
which includes Leeson’s activities, showed an operating profit over 1994 which was five 
times what had been planned for that year. Nobody within Barings questioned these 
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impressive figures from a business that should be virtually riskless. In particular in the 
Nikkei futures market, headquarters believed it occupied a niche, because Barings were 
members of both the OSE and SIMEX and had developed the business, clientele and 
reputation to deal in and between those markets (BoE, §3.58-3.60). Chairman Peter 
Baring concluded that “it is not actually terribly difficult to make money in the securities 
business” (Leeson, 1996, p.56). Specifically commenting on Barings’ main profit center, 
Leeson’s direct boss in London, Michael Killian, said in February 1995: “That guy is a 
turbo arbitrageur!” (BoE, §3.63). 
 
2.2 Unauthorized trading 
On July 3, 1992, only two days after Barings was granted membership by SIMEX, Leeson 
opened Account 88888 and that same day, the first transaction was booked in this account 
(SR3.13). On BFS’s system, this account was described as an error account. It is common 
for traders to set up such an account for the purpose of netting minor trading mistakes. 
The net position should be closed each day and the net value of gains and losses incurred 
in negating the position should be recorded as part of the unit’s daily profit (Leeson, 1996,
p.38-39). However, already during the first month of its existence, a large number of 
transactions were booked in Account 88888, which shows according to the Singapore 
report (SR3.13) that it could never have been intended to serve solely as an error account. 
As a matter of fact, Leeson gave specific instructions around July 8, 1992, to change the 
software to exclude Account 88888 from all market activity reports and the information 
was only used for the estimation of SIMEX’s margins. In other words, the steps taken by 
Leeson in the first days of responsibility for activities of BFS, were to ensure that his 
actions would not be transparent (Hogan, 1999). 
 
During 1993, the main focus of Leeson’s unauthorized speculative positions in 
Account 88888 was the generation of profits in the ordinary trading accounts of BSL, and 
BSJ for their clients or proprietary traders. This enabled Leeson to gain a reputation as a 
star trader on SIMEX and enhanced his intrafirm executive standing. However, by the end 
of 1993 the cumulative losses in Account 88888 were over ¥4 billion (about US$35.8 
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million) which made the situation much more complex. Leeson’s main problem became the 
management of the flow of funds to support the margin calls from SIMEX. 
An important way to arrange the funding was by manipulating the trading and 
accounting records. This was done in a number of ways. First, most transactions booked 
in Account 88888 were initially booked in the accounts of BSJ and BSL. If these positions 
had been correctly reported to BSJ or BSL, it would have been clear that risk limits had 
been exceeded since such transactions were not hedged. However, Leeson would execute 
offsetting trades about thirty seconds before market close to place transactions from BSL 
or BSJ accounts into Account 88888. With these so-called “transfer trades”, Leeson 
avoided disclosure of unhedged positions in the reports to BSJ and BSL (SR3.21). The 
prices of these transfer trades were later adjusted to favor BSL or BSJ, at the expense of 
Account 88888, in order to confirm his reputation as an exceptional trader. This would 
often require complicated alterations between different sets of records (SR3.24). A second 
way to manipulate the records was to record fictitious trades between the accounts of 
BSL and BSJ and Account 88888 in the BFS daily list of transactions, when no transfer 
trades had been executed. The effect was that unhedged positions were transferred from 
the BSJ or BSL accounts to Account 88888, so that no unhedged positions were repored 
at the end of the day (SR3.31). Finally, Leeson often instructed his settlements staff to 
record fictitious trades in the accounting system. These fictitious trades were reversed at 
the opening of the market on the following day. The purpose was to reduce end-of-day 
open positions in Nikkei and JGB futures in BFS’s accounting records and consequently in 
the SIMEX computer system. This practice effectively reduced margin calls from SIMEX 
(SR3.37). Figure 1 shows an example of the effect of recording fictitious trades on margin 
calls. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Despite the manipulations of the books, the funds needed for SIMEX’s margin calls 
steadily increased. Leeson used a number of methods to convince BSL management of the 
necessity to transfer large sums of money to Singapore. First, he explained that the prof ts 
from individual arbitrage transactions are small and therefore trading volumes should be 
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large. Since both exchanges involved in the transaction require separate margins to be 
deposited, large amounts of money are needed. Second, Leeson claimed that SIMEX 
demanded so-called “advance margin calls” (SR3.42). Supposedly, these advance margin 
calls were intra-d y margin requirements imposed by SIMEX as a result of volatility in the 
trading prices of the relevant contracts (SR3.43). Leeson convinced BSL that it was 
difficult to obtain same day payment from the ultimate client due to differences in time 
zones. Therefore, BSL had to finance these requirements. In addition to the funds 
transferred from London, Leeson sold options on the Nikkei index through Account 
88888 from the start of 1993. From January 1994, the position in Nikkei options increased 
significantly when Leeson set up a large series of short straddle positions.3 
 
2.3 Positions in February 1995 
The largest part of Barings’ losses came from a massive long position in Nikkei futures. 
Until October 1993, Leeson’s losses were always recovered. After that, losses increased 
gradually, but accelerated in the final two months leading up to the collapse of Barings. 
During that final stage, Leeson expa d d his long position in Nikkei futures to 49% of the 
open interest in the March 1995 contract and 24% in the June 1995 contract (BoE, 
§4.25). The total monthly trading volume through Account 88888 increased from 2,051 in 
July 1992 to a peak of 96,121 in September 1994. In January 1995, the total was 90,000 
contracts (SR3.14) or about 7.5% of total trading volume. 
There had been a similar growth in the trading of JGB futures. By November 
1994, the volume of JGB futures transacted through Account 88888 represented 24% of 
the total volume on SIMEX (SR3.19). The volume of Leeson’s unhedged JGB position in 
the 88888 account also increased, in particular during the two months leading up to 
Barings’ collapse. Eventually, his short position was over 28,000 contracts. 
Leeson started to trade Euroyen futures through the 88888-account in October 
1993, but after that month, his transactions in this market were limited to certain short 
time intervals only. The eventual loss on these Euroyen positions was ‘only’ £3 million 
(BoE, §4.43). 
                                         
3 A short straddle is a combination of a short call and a short put with the same exercise price. 
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Leeson first sold options on the Nikkei index  in October 1992, but his activity in 
this market really started in the second half of 1993. The value of the option portfolio 
fluctuated wildly over time, but it had mostly been positive. The highest value was reached 
by the end of December 1994, when the total value of the options was approximately 
US$178 million. Mainly due to the Kobe Earthquake, this reversed to a loss of 
approximately US$108 million by the end of February 1995 (SR App. 3K, p.179). 
Eventually, on February 23, 1995, Barings was not able to meet its margin 
requirements on SIMEX. The total loss accumulated by Leeson was US$1.4 billion.
 
 
3. Doubling 
 
That managers take additional risks to escape from a threatening situation is a well-known 
theme in the field of managerial decision making. For example, Shapira (1997) and 
Kahneman and Tversky (1986, p. S258) show that people will take greater risks to escape 
losses than to secure gains. As a consequence, people's behavior tends to change i  
unexpected and unattractive ways when they are confronted with increasing losses. Thus 
in finance, where many occupations are high-wire acts, the fear of falling is constantly in 
the background and sometimes can lure people into disastrous activ tie . Individuals can 
become gripped by a frantic panic and may try to conceal these losses, or double up their 
bets like crazed gamblers trying to punt their way out of their mounting debts. This is the 
classic gambler’s fallacy. 
 
In the case of Leeson, Gapper and Denton (1997) paint a vivid picture of a person 
who seeks to become the master of the universe, managing to gain a reputation as a star 
performer. Leeson tried at all cost not to lose that image. When losses were mounting, he 
followed a strategy of continuously expanding his position. A quote from Leeson (1996) 
may illustrate our point: 
 “I felt no elation at this success. I was determined to win back the losses. And as 
the spring wore on, I traded harder and harder, risking more and more. I was well d wn, 
but increasingly sure that my doubling up and doubling up would pay off ... I redoubled 
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my exposure. The risk was that the market could crumble down, but on this occasion it 
carried on upwards ... As the market soared in July [1993] my position translated from a 
£6 million loss back into glorious profit. 
I was so happy that night I didn’t think I’d ever go through that kind of tension 
again. I’d pulled back a large position simply by holding my nerve ... but first thing on 
Monday morning I found that I had to use the 88888 account again ... it became an 
addiction.” (Leeson, 1996, pp.63-64). 
 
Our interest in doubling comes from the fact that it is potentially harmful to the system. An 
important attribute of doubling strategies is that the inevitable and dev stating loss is 
preceded by a period of high returns with low volatility. Conditional on the bad event not 
having happened (yet), the doubler’s investment performance appears to indicate 
significant investment skill. The doubler may then become too big to fail, both from the 
perspective of the investment firm and from the market regulators, so that the inevitable 
failure can have catastrophic effects, both for the firm and for the market. Should Leeson’s 
activities have been discovered and stopped one month earlier, i.e. by the end of January 
1995, the total loss would have been about one quarter of the eventual loss. This could 
probably have been absorbed by Barings, saving the bank as an independent entity 
(SR.ES36, p.B-i). Kane and DeTrask (1999, p.216) suggest that the Barings management 
may even have known about Leeson’s exposures and allowed him to expand his bets as 
their only chance to avert disaster. 
 
 
4. Return–volume relationships 
 
A doubling strategy implies a relationship between a security’s return and its trading 
volume. This relationship should be asymmetric: in the case of a long (short) position, a 
price fall (rise) would be followed by a significant volume increase, while a price rise (fall) 
would not. In addition, a trader following such a strategy may only start doubling his 
position after the price crosses a certain threshold. This should be distinguished from the 
information hypothesis that posits a contemporaneous or lagged relation from volume to 
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returns. Under this hypothesis, volume is proxying for the flow of information and changes 
in investor’s expectations (Harris and Raviv, 1993). There has been some study of the 
asymmetric relationship between volume and return. Karpoff (1988) and Suominen (1996) 
suggest that in equity markets the observed positive correlation between volume and 
returns can be explained by the presence of differential costs in acquiring short and long 
positions. This asymmetry is not observed in futures markets, since the costs of taking 
short and long positions in such markets are equal. For example, Kocagil and 
Shachmurove (1998) calculate the contemporaneous correlation coefficients between the 
two variables in 16 major U.S. futures markets and find no significant relationship4. 
 One rationalization fr a doubling strategy is that it is a way to exploit market 
inefficiencies, particularly where large volumes of trading can influence market prices. 
Indeed Leeson (1996) defends his actions in these terms. This market inefficiency 
explanation posits an intertemporal causality relationship running from volume to return. 
 
 
5. Data and Methodology 
 
5.1 Data 
Daily information is available for the full period Leeson was active in Singapore, i.e. from 
January 1992 until 1995, for all relevant products. The information i cludes daily volume, 
open interest, opening, closing, highest and lowest price. 
 For all SIMEX products we have tick data as well. The information includes price, 
type of price (trade, bid or ask) and time to the second. However, the size of individual 
transactions is not recorded simultaneously in the open-ou cry system. 
 For Nikkei futures and options traded on the OSE, we also have transaction data 
for the period from July 1, 1994, which is 6 months before the Kobe earthquake, until July 
1, 1995, which is 4 months after the bankruptcy of Barings. The information includes time 
to the minute, price (only trades) and trading volume. However, the Japanese dataset does 
not include quotes.  
                                         
4 On the other hand, Moosa and Silvapulle (2000) study the crude oil futures market and find linear 
causality from volume to price and bi-directional nonlinear causality. They stress the importance of 
nonlinear causality testing. 
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A first look at the data reveals that the Nikkei futures marke , which is the most 
important market in our study, is very liquid. Table 1 compares daily average trading value 
of Nikkei futures during five sub-periods of our sample. Please note that the OSE contract 
has twice the size of the SIMEX contract. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Information on the trading activities of Nick Leeson were collected from secondary 
material, in particular from the Singapore Report (Lim and Tan, 1995) and the Board of 
Banking Supervision (1995). 
 
5.2 Methodology 
 
Price effects: Nikkei futures 
Leeson gradually became a dominant player on the Nikkei futures market in Singapore and 
he clearly believed his actions had price impact5. Therefore, a first test is to see whether 
his trades actually influenced prices during the months leading up to Barings’ collapse. His 
transactions on SIMEX may have led to structural price differences between the OSE and 
SIMEX. This also provides us with a direct test of the efficiency of the market. 
 
We directly calculate the mean price difference of the two contracts every 15 minutes of 
the trading day, provided th re is a transaction on both exchanges. The prices are based on 
the last transaction in a given 15-minute interval. We also test Equation (2), using the 
lagged SIMEX price, because purchases by Leeson which lead to a positive price 
difference will be followed by arbitrage transactions between the OSE and SIMEX. 
 
 DIFFt = Pt
OSE - Pt
SIMEX (1) 
 
                                         
5 Indeed Leeson (1996) argues that his relative lack of success in exploiting the consequent price impact 
was due to other traders intercepting information about h s tr ding activities. 
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 LAGDIFFt = Pt
OSE - Pt-1
SIMEX  (2) 
 
 where DIFF = price difference OSE vs. SIMEX 
  LAGDIFF = price on OSE vs. lagged price on SIMEX
  Pt = last transaction price in interval t. 
 
For this test we split the sample into five sub-periods6: 
 
Period start end  
1 July 1, 1994 Oct. 31, 1994 base period 
2 Nov. 1, 1994 Jan. 16, 1995 heavy trading by Leeson 
3 Jan. 17, 1995 Feb. 23, 1995 between earthquake and Leeson’s departure 
4 Feb. 24, 1995 Mar. 10, 1995 period of uncertain y until ING takes over 
all liabilities 
5 Mar. 11, 1995 July 1, 1995 stabilization 
 
During period 1, one would not expect a significant price difference, since no major events 
took place and arbitrage would probably take care of price differentials instantly. In period 
2, Leeson purchases massive amounts of futures on SIMEX, trying to push up prices. His 
actions may have caused price differentials to be more persistent. During period 3, the 
market became much more volatile and price differentials may have persisted for a longer 
period. Leeson stepped up his purchases on SIMEX. Period 4 covers the interval during 
which SIMEX experienced the largest threat. If traders were concerned about the health 
of the exchange, one would expect them to be prepared to pay a premium to hold Osaka 
futures. Ito and Lin (1996) find some evidence for an increased systemic threat during this 
period. Finally, period 5 would be a period of stabilization, returning to a ‘normal’ market. 
 
Doubling and price - volume relationship 
We investigate whether Leeson – or some other trader on SIMEX – was involved in 
doubling transactions. If the doubling story is correct, we would expect to see an 
asymmetric response of SIMEX volume to price changes: prices go down, volume 
                                         
6 Quandt (1958 and 1960) proposes a methodology to determine the breakpoints between the time periods 
endogenously. However, this technology does make the strong assumption that differences in the volatility 
of price differences is solely due to the activities of Leeson in the markets. The procedure would also 
identify any changes in trading practices between Singapore and Osaka as being "significant".
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increases, with the increase in volume a function of the number of downticks. However, if 
prices go up we should not see such a strong relationship. Of course, we only have 
aggregate data, but if it is true that Leeson was such a significant player, we should see his 
trades in the aggregate data. We should realize that many studies have shown a 
relationship between trading activity and volatility, but as noted before, Kocagil and 
Shachmurove (1998) show such asymmetry does not exist in futures markets. In our 
sample, however, we do expect to find asymmetry between a falling and a rising market, 
resulting from Leeson’s trading strategy. As indicated above, Leeson’s losses would 
increase with a falling Nikkei index and rising JGB futures prices. Hence, we take the 
spread between the Nikkei futures return and the JGB futures return on day t-1 as the 
explanatory variable for doubling activities on day t. Formally, we test the following 
equation for the Nikkei and for the JGB futures market: 
 
 t1tJGB1tNikkeit PPvolume e+D-D×b+a= -- )( ,,  (3) 
 
 where volumet = daily trading volume on SIMEX on day t 
  DPt-1 = the logarithmic close-t -close return day t-1 
 
For this test, we split the sample into three periods of approximately 75 trading days each. 
Period 1 covers the interval from July 1, 1994 until October 31, 1994, Period 2 from 
November 1, 1994 until February 23, 1995, and Period 3 from February 25, 1995 until 
June 30, 1995.7 The asymmetry is expected to be strongest in period 2.8 
 
Doubling: direct tests 
As Leeson was betting on rising Japanese share prices and interest rates, we expect the net 
long Nikkei position and short JGB position to increase as losses increase. Using daily 
information between January 25 and February 24, 1995 (SR App.3J, p.178), we relate the 
                                         
7 Quandt’s (1958, 1960) methodology may also be used to determine the appropriate division between the 
three subperiods. However, the analysis makes the strong hypothesis of homoskedasticity between 
regimes, while our data indicates that the volatility increased substantially during the period surrounding 
the Kobe earthquake. 
8 Since Leeson partly financed margin requirements on his futures positions by selling Nikkei options, we 
also tested whether the value of open interest in Nikkei options, both puts and calls, indeed increases 
when prices fell. The empirical results are weakly supportive. 
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build-up of new positions in the 88888-account to the cumulated profit and loss. We test 
the following equation: 
 
 ttt CUMGPOS e+×b+a=  (5) 
 
 where POSt = net Nikkei and JGB futures position after January  
   25, 1995, on day t 
  CUMGt = the cumulated gain on day t 
 
 
 6. Results 
 
From the literature it appears that Leeson was an active trader in Nikkei futures on 
SIMEX. Leeson (1996) shows that during certain periods, he was a very active buyer of 
Nikkei futures on SIMEX (see Figure 2). His desperate attempts to ‘double’ himself out 
of the losses increased in the final months of 1994 and, in particular the first two months 
of 1995. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the T-test. The price difference is calculated as the price on 
the OSE minus the price on SIMEX.9 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Over the whole sample, the SIMEX contract appears to be slightly but significantly more 
expensive than the OSE contract. As expected, price differences during period 1 are 
insignificant. During period 2 price differences increase and become significant. After the 
                                         
9 When both OSE and SIMEX are open, we take the difference between the last transaction price of each 
15-minute interval on SIMEX and on the OSE. In the case of lagged price differences we use the SIMEX 
price with a 15-minute lag. 
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earthquake, the price difference increases even more. After Leeson’s departure, price 
differences decline, but prices in Singapore remain higher than in Osaka. Traders 
apparently did not demand a discount to hold SIMEX futures during this period of 
confusion. Finally, the price difference increases slightly in period 5 and remains 
significant. 
 
Table 3 presents the evidence relating to doubling activities in the Nikkei futures market 
on SIMEX. We take the spread between Nikkei futures return and the JGB futures return 
on day t-1 to explain increased trading on day t. The wider the spread, t  larger the losses 
Leeson incurred on day t-1, and the more inclined he should have been to double his 
position on day t. During period 1, the relationship between price movements and trading 
volume were not significant. During period 2, the relationship between volume and 
negative price changes becomes highly significant, both economically and statistically. This 
result is strongly suggestive of doubling activity in this market. In Period 3, after Leeson 
left the market, the relationship works in a sim lar direction, probably the result of a 
reversal in the causal relationship as Leeson's positions were unwound in a falling market. 
However, the economic and statistical significance of the negative return - 
volume relationship is greatly diminished 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 4 presents our findings regarding JGB futures. Results do not support the presence 
of doubling activity, consistent with there being a different market for JGB futures than 
merely Leeson’s trading behavior.10 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                                         
10 These results do not change when only prior Nikkei futures returns are used as the explanatory variable. 
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Doubling: direct tests 
During the final month at Barings, Leeson was betting on rising Japanese hare prices and 
interest rates. He built up large positions on both the Nikkei and the JGB futures market. 
We directly test whether Leeson behaved like a doubler, by relating increases in cumulated 
losses to increases in his net position. Figure 3 provids an indication that there is a 
relationship. Cumulating the positions and trading gains (losses) from January 26, 199511 
we find that net long positions increased exponentially as trading losses mounted up to the 
point where Leeson departed Barings Futures (Singapore). In Figure 4 we document that 
the net long position was an increasing function of the net trading losses, and that the only 
time there were any (modest) sales were on the occasion of net gains relative to the 
position as of January 26, 1995. This negative relationship between position and trading 
results is significant at the 1% level. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3, 4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the trading strategy attributed to Mr. Nicholas Leeson, who was the 
chief derivatives trader of Barings bank in Singapore until the bank’s collapse in February 
1995. We claim that Leeson followed a doubling strategy: by continuously doubling his 
position when prices fell, he tried to trade his way out of growing losses. Among other 
things, this has important consequences for the effectiveness of Value at Risk-controls. 
Being able to track and take out these traders sooner, would limit possible systemic risks. 
 
Leeson's trading activities mainly involved three futures markets: Futures on the 
Nikkei index, futures on 10-year Japanese Government bonds and Euroyen futures. These 
products are all traded simultaneously and in similar design on SIMEX and on a Japanese 
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exchange. We perform various tests on daily data from all relevant markets, and on 
transaction data from markets for Nikkei derivatives. Based on the analysis of the raw 
data, we conclude that someone, probably Leeson, did indeed follow a doubling strategy 
in the Nikkei futures market. And second, the actual information on Leeson’s trading 
activities confirms that he followed a trading strategy: Leeson clearly expanded his 
position when prices were falling. 
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Figure 1 
Example illustrating the effect of recording fictitious trades on SIMEX margin calls 
a. Without entry of fictitious trade 
 Assuming no outstanding contracts had been brought forward – 
 
 Trades executed during the day Long Short 
 Client A  30,000 
 Account 88888 27,000 
  ---------- ---------- 
 Position at the end of the day 27,000 30,000 
  ---------- ---------- 
 Gross long position to be reported to SIMEX via 
 Position Change Sheet (PCS) 27,000 
  ---------- 
 On receiving PCS, SIMEX will show the following 
 outstanding position 27,000 30,000 
  ---------- ---------- 
 
 Margin deposits required will be calculated as follows: 
  Number of gross contracts x margin per contract 
  = (27,000 + 30,000) x margin per contract,
  = 57,000 x margin per contract 
 
b. With entry of fictitious trade 
 Assuming no outstanding contracts had been brought forward – 
 
 Trades executed during the day Long Short 
 Client A  30,0 0 
 Account 88888 27,000 
 Entry of fictitious trade for Account 88888  26,000 
  ---------- ---------- 
 Position at the end of the day after the entry of the 
 fictitious trade will be 
 Client A  30,000 
 Account 88888 (27,000 – 26,000) 1,000 
  ---------- ---------- 
  1,000 30,000 
  ---------- ---------- 
 Gross long position to be reported to SIMEX via PCS 1,000 
  ---------- 
 On receiving PCS, SIMEX will compute the outstanding short 
 position as follows  4000 
   ---------- 
 
 Margin deposits required will then be calculated as follows: 
  = (1,000 + 4,000) x margin per contract
  = 5,000 x margin per contract 
Source: SR, App. 3H, p.176 
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Figure 2 
Leeson and SIMEX Nikkei futures 
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Source: SIMEX tick database and Leeson (1996) 
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Figure 3 
Net investment and cumulated trading profits from 26 January 1995 
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Figure 4 
Net position as a function of trading results 
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Table 1 
Nikkei futures: average daily trading activity 
 number of contracts number of transactions 
 OSE SIMEX OSE SIMEX 
July - October 1994 21567 20568 1362 1365 
November 1994 - earthquake 24818 20267 1292 1081 
earthquake - bankruptcy 35376 35421 1960 1670 
bankruptcy - purchase by ING 29054 35877 1687 1649 
purchase by ING - July 1995 25435 24878 1817 1679 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Nikkei futures price difference OSE and SIMEX 
DIFF  T-test 
 mean std. dev. N t-value p-value 
total -0.3383 6.654 56258 -12.06 0.000 
period 1 -0.0071 6.061 20438 -0.17 0.876 
period 2 -0.5391 5.325 6567 -8.20 0.000 
period 3 -0.7086 6.666 6781 -8.75 0.000 
period 4 -0.4080 8.364 2733 -2.55 0.011 
period 5 -0.4775 7.320 19739 -9.16 0.000 
 
LAGDIFF   T-test 
 mean std. dev. N t-value p-value 
total -0.3427 26.0421 55020 -3.09 0.002 
period 1 -0.0853 9.028 19868 -1.33 0.183 
period 2 -0.6778 14.599 6300 -3.68 0.000 
period 3 -0.7581 10.767 6694 -5.76 0.000 
period 4 -0.6605 12.380 2710 -2.78 0.006 
period 5 -0.3098 41.291 19448 -1.05 0.295 
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Table 3 
Asymmetries in volume-return relationships: Nikkei futures trading on SIMEX 
 
 Positive prior return  Negative prior return  Difference 
 aup bup Adjusted  R
2 adown bdown Adjusted  R
2 bup-bdown 
23294.2 -374792.8 0.01 20779.1 -399334.3 0.01 24541.5 
(9.54) (-1.22)  (6.19) (-1.15)  (0.05) 
July-
October 
1994 0.000 0.114  0.000 0.129  0.479 
25496.4 324559.7 0.02 25778.3 -441181.3 0.09 765741.1 
(9.51) (1.21)  (11.51) (-2.35)  (2.34) 
November 
1994 – 
bankruptcy 0.000 0.117  0.000 0.012  0.010 
28274.5 -6410.3 -0.03 26053.2 -251528.4 0.05 245118.1 
(9.06) (-0.03)  (10.24) (-1.88)  (1.04) 
Bankruptcy
-July 1995 
0.000 0.487  0.000 0.033  0.150 
 
 
Table 4 
Asymmetries in volume-return relationships: JGB futures trading on SIMEX 
 
 Positive prior return  Negative prior return  Difference 
 aup bup Adjusted  
R2 
adown bdown Adjusted  
R2 
bup-bdown 
2500.5 -31985.1 -0.02 2130.2 -27206.4 -0.02 -4778.7 
(5.36) (-0.55)  (4.41) (-0.54)  (-0.06) 
July-
October 
1994 0.000 0.294  0.000 0.295  0.475 
5280.3 -111408.9 0.02 4128.8 31737.2 -0.02 -143146.1 
(5.84) (-1.24)  (6.10) (0.56)  (-1.34) 
November 
1994 – 
bankruptcy 0.000 0.113  0.000 0.289  0.090 
756.6 6954.8 -0.02 840.9 -2667.7 -0.02 9622.5 
(4.42) (0.65)  (5.84) (-0.35)  (0.74) 
Bankruptcy-
July 1995 
0.000 0.260  0.000 0.363  0.231 
 
Numbers in these tables represent the regression coefficients in the regression volumt=a + b(DPNikkei,t-1 - 
DPJGB,t-1 ) + et , where DPt represents the first difference in the natural logarithm of  prices and Nikke  and 
JGB represent the SIMEX Nikkei and JBG contracts respectively. The subscripts up and down represent 
regimes where the prior change in price was positive and negative respectively. Numbers in brackets 
represent t-values, with associated p-values in italics. 
 
 
